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This essay addresses the ongoing debate, both judicial and political, over 
whether “pay-for-delay” settlements of patent infringement claims brought 
by branded pharmaceutical companies against generic competitors under 
the auspices of a Hatch-Waxman “Paragraph IV” ANDA certification 
should be deemed per se violations of the U.S. antitrust laws.  It begins by 
placing the debate in the context of three overlapping legal regimes: 
patent, food and drug, and antitrust law.  Next, it considers the debate over 
per se liability as a clash between two largely incommensurable legal 
paradigms.  To help resolve the dispute, the author suggests that we 
consider a nontraditional perspective on intellectual property rights, 
measuring them not against a but-for world of legally unprotected words 
and ideas (an approach which tends to emphasize the need to protect and 
incentivize innovation) but rather against the world of real property.  The 
distinctions between real and intellectual property provide an intellectual 
framework favoring lower protection for suspect patent claims, and the 
essay provides both conceptual and empirical arguments for moving in 
that direction in the Hatch-Waxman context. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Among the most hotly debated topics in antitrust law in recent years has been the 
question whether so-called “pay-for-delay” (PFD) or “reverse payment” settlements of 3 
patent infringement lawsuits brought pursuant to the “Paragraph IV” provisions in the 
Hatch-Waxman Act should be deemed per se violations of the U.S. antitrust laws.   
Paragraph IV applies when a pharmaceutical company seeking U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval for a generic version of a pioneer drug still under patent 
certifies its belief that the patent either is invalid or will not be infringed by the generic.  
Hatch-Waxman authorizes the patent holder to sue in response to this certification, and an 
increasingly common way of settling the ensuing litigation entails the plaintiff/pioneer 
drug company paying the defendant/generic to stay off the market for a period of time.   
This sort of PFD agreement results in the plaintiff maintaining its monopoly over 
the sale of that drug, a monopoly which it might have lost had the suit gone to trial and 
the generic defendant prevailed on the patent claim.  As such, the question arises whether 
this should be considered a naked agreement among horizontal competitors to allocate 
markets – a quintessential per se violation of Section I of the Sherman Act – or whether 
the fact that the plaintiff holds a patent on the drug provides presumptive immunity from 
antitrust liability.   
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has long considered these sorts of 
agreements to be illegal, a view embraced by the Sixth Circuit in In re Cardizem CD 
Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896 (2003), and more recently adopted by the Antitrust 
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) as well.  Nevertheless, despite the 
FTC’s early successes in prosecuting and restricting PFD agreements, both that agency 
and private plaintiffs have encountered a series of setbacks since 2004, as most other 
courts to consider the issue have treated PFDs as presumptively legal as long as the 
agreements do not exceed the facial scope of the patent at issue.  Most recently, despite 4 
vocal opposition to PFDs from both of the elected branches, a proposed legislative ban 
was not included in either of the 2010 health care reform laws.
1   
In this paper, I begin by reviewing the three legal regimes – patent, food and drug, 
and antitrust – that jointly provide the framework for challenges to PFD settlements.  I 
then trace the debate between proponents and opponents of PFDs, focusing on the 
question of whether such agreements should be treated as presumptively legal or illegal 
under the antitrust laws.  Many of the arguments will be familiar to students of the PFD 
question.  What I offer is what I hope will be a potentially useful framework for assessing 
those arguments.  The conventional perspective is that intellectual property (IP) such as 
patents should receive legal protection only to the limited extent necessary to encourage 
innovation.  That focus on innovation tends to favor a protective approach to drug 
patents, which we naturally consider to be among the most socially valuable 
technological innovations.   
I argue that it is equally instructive to think not in terms of why IP does receive 
some legal protection, but rather in terms of why it gets less protection than does tangible 
property such as real estate.  Focusing on the ways in which IP falls short of physical 
property, and is less deserving of legal protection, emphasizes the dangers in providing 
too much legal sanctuary to settlement agreements which sacrifice consumer welfare on 
the altar of intellectual property rights.
                                                 
1 For discussions of recent political activity on PFD restrictions, as well as comparisons of the leading 
proposals in the House (HR 1706/3962) and Senate (S.369), see generally “Health Bill Drops Ban On 
Deals Between Brand- Generic-Drug Makers,” Wall Street Journal (17 March 2010); Steven Seidenberg, 
“The Flip Side of Reverse Payments,” ABA Journal, (10 February 2010); Geoffrey A. Manne and Joshua 
D. Wright, “New Federal Initiatives Project Reverse Payment Settlements and Upcoming Congressional 
Action,” The Federalist Society (20 August 2009), available at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/reversepayments.pdf.  5 
II. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
  Challenges to PFD reverse payment settlements of generic-branded 
pharmaceutical patent infringement claims provide fodder for both interesting and 
complex legal analysis because such agreements take place at the intersection of three 
distinct legal regimes, raising the question which of these sometimes incommensurable 
paradigms ought to govern.
2  The claims settled by PFDs are formally brought as patent 
infringement actions, and hence implicate the patent laws’ concern with balancing the 
incentivizing of innovation against the desire to bring useful developments into the public 
domain.  In the unique pharmaceutical context, however, such considerations are filtered 
through the FDA’s new drug approval process, and specifically through the Hatch-
Waxman regime.  The latter represents a Congressional effort to encourage the 
development of life-saving drugs, while simultaneously assuring that those drugs become 
available at competitive prices as soon as possible.  Finally, the antitrust laws seek to 
ensure that monopolies are not unreasonably maintained, given their tendency to increase 
prices, limit output and otherwise compromise consumer welfare.  The various proposals 
which have been developed for applying antitrust standards to PFD agreements must thus 





                                                 
2 Yuki Onoe, Comment: “‘Pay-For-Delay Settlements in Pharmaceutical Litigation: Drawing a Fine Line 
Between Patent Zone and Antitrust Zone,” 9 J. Marshall. Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 528, 530 (2010). 
3 Of course, at some level of generality the goals of these three legal regimes are the same: the regulation of 
productive activity so as to maximize social welfare.  Nevertheless, the three systems differ, at times 
substantially, not only in terms of the regulatory levers which they employ and the types of productive 
activity which they target, but also in terms of their underlying value choices: whether to favor long term 
innovation over short term consumer welfare, the importance of fairness, how to strike the balance between 
the interests of society and those of individual economic actors, etc. 6 
  A. PATENT LAW 
Article I of the U.S. Constitution grants to Congress the authority to pass laws to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
4 
The primary goals of the patent system are (1) to promote public disclosure of inventions 
and (2) to incentivize innovation by rewarding inventors with the exclusive rights, for a 
period of time, to practice their inventions.
5  The patent laws generate this incentive by  
conferring on a patent holder the right “to exclude others from making, using, offering for 
sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into 
the United States.”
6  In return for the patent right, an inventor is required to disclose how 
to make and use her invention, enabling the public to recreate and benefit from the 
invention after the patent term expires.
7  The length of the term of patent protection, 
currently set at 20 years for most new inventions, thus represents a Congressional attempt 
to balance these conflicting goals of encouraging and rewarding innovation with the grant 
of a temporary monopoly over the fruits of invention while simultaneously ensuring that 
the invention will eventually redound to the public good as other parties are freed to use 
and improve upon it. 
 
     
 
                                                 
4 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 8.  
5 Sheila Kadura, Note: “Is an Absolute Ban on Reverse Payments the Appropriate Way to Prevent 
Anticompetitive Agreements Between Branded- and Generic-Pharmaceutical Companies?,”  86 Tex. L. 
Rev. 647, 648 (2008). 
6 Id. at 648, quoting 35 U.S.C. §154 (a) (1) (2000). 
7 Kadura at 648. 7 
1. Pharmaceutical patents 
The tensions inherent in the patent regime between fostering and disseminating 
innovation are perhaps most pronounced in the pharmaceutical industry.  On the one 
hand, a sizable share of a drug company’s costs lie in the expensive new drug 
development and approval process.
8  Because only one in approximately 5,000 novel 
therapeutic compounds that undergo animal testing will ever successfully pass through 
the lengthy FDA approval regime, the average cost to develop a new drug is somewhere 
between $500 million and $1 billion.
9  As a result, it has been estimated that some 60 
percent of pharmaceutical products would not have been invented in the absence of 
potential patent protection.
10  Indeed, one perennial complaint about the legal regime 
governing nutritional supplements such as herbs is that the inability to obtain patents on 
naturally occurring substances removes the incentive for vendors to engage in costly 
research to establish their safety and effectiveness.
11  
On the other hand, as the ongoing national debate over the 2010 health care 
reform legislation
12 makes clear, holding down spiraling health care costs is a matter of 
substantial public concern.  In 2006, Americans spent $217 billion on pharmaceuticals, or 
more than ten percent of total heath expenditures.
13  As the share of the national health 
                                                 
8 See generally Peter Barton Hutt et al, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials 577, 620 ff. (2007);  
http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/PPreport89a5.pdf. 
9 Kadura at 648-49.  See also Onoe at 531 (noting that the overall cost of developing a marketable drug is 
over $800 million). 
10 See FTC Staff, Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition in the New High-Tech, Global Marketplace 
chs, 6-7 (1996). 
11 See, e.g., Jerry I.-H. Hsiao, “Patent Protection for Chinese Herbal Medicine Product Invention in 
Taiwan,” 10 J. World Intell. Prop. 1 (2007); Esther Bull et al, “Nutraceuticals,” 265 Pharm. J. 57 (2000). 
12 Public Law No: 111-148 and Public Law No: 111-152. 
13 Kaiser Family Foundation, “Prescription Drug Trends,” 1-2 (September 2008), available at 
http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/3057_07.pdf. 8 
care dollar represented by drugs continues to rise, holding down drug prices will remain a 
national priority. 
 
    2. Patent vulnerability 
One feature of the patent laws with significant implications for the generic 
pharmaceutical industry is that while patents are by law presumed to be valid,
14 in fact 
many patents are unable to hold up under legal challenge.  Indeed, for “those unfamiliar 
with the nature of prosecution at the [United States] Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
and the reality of patent litigation, the level of uncertainty underlying such intellectual 
property rights is astonishing.”
15  This uncertainty reflects the inherent nature of 
intellectual property, as well as various pragmatic factors.   
When deciding whether to grant a patent on a (purportedly) new invention, the 
PTO must determine whether the underlying technologies are sufficiently distinct from 
closely related ones to count as novel.
16  It must determine whether, in retrospect, one 
skilled in the art would have seen the innovation as obvious prior to its development.
17  It 
must determine how narrowly or broadly to construe claim language defining an area of 
technology about which the examiners may know relatively little and which in fact may 
describe a process for creating something not yet in existence.
18  Then, courts, upon an 
infringement challenge, must make all of these determinations anew, viewed through the 
                                                 
14  Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents, § 19.02 (2008). 
15 Alan Devlin, “Indeterminism and the Property-Patent Equation,” 28 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 61, 75 (2009). 
16 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... the invention was patented or 
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country ... more than one year prior to the date of the 
application for patent in the United States.”). 
17 Id. § 103(a) (“A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between the subject matter sought to be 
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious.”). 
18 Devlin at 75 (noting “the well-documented limitations of language in explaining the nature of a claimed 
invention concisely”). 9 
filter of a similar, rival invention.  Given the ambiguities inherent in this highly 
subjective process, which tries to cut clear dividing lines into a nearly seamless spectrum 
of technological research and creative activity, it comes as little surprise that despite the 
best efforts of the PTO a disturbingly high percent of challenged patents are eventually 
found to be invalid (or their claims so narrow as to not be infringed by imitative 
technologies).
19 
There are also pragmatic barriers to patent reliability.  These encompass “a dearth 
of pecuniary resources [on the part of the PTO], an increase in the number of [patent] 
applications, a proliferation of subject matter, examiners’ inability to dispose of an 
unworthy application once and for all, the nonadversarial nature of the proceeding, 
information asymmetry, and the fact that an applicant does not bear the burden of 
patentability[, all of which] combine to limit the PTO’s ability to assess applications 
accurately.”
20  As a result of these factors, it has been estimated that patents litigated to 
judgment will be invalidated in nearly of half of all infringement suits.
21 
  Given these challenges, some commentators have advocated a “probabilistic” 
view of patent rights under which patents are treated as no more than stochastic “lottery 
tickets that may or may not yield exclusive power.”
22  A corollary of this theory is that 
rather than being entitled to exclude would-be infringers, patent holders are 
presumptively entitled only to a “right to try to exclude.”
23  In other words, patentees 
                                                 
19 Devlin. 
20 Id. at 97. 
21 Id. at 76 and n.73 (collecting studies). 
22 Id. at 63.  See also Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro, “Probabilistic Patents,” 19 J. Econ. Persp. 75 
(2005). 
23 Onoe at 532. 10 
have the right to assert their patents, but their exclusionary power is not fully vested until 
validated by judicial decisions upholding the patent validity.
24 
 
B.  THE FOOD, DRUG & COSMETIC ACT 
Along with obtaining a patent, or patents, on its formulation, the major procedural 
hurdle that a pharmaceutical company must surmount in bringing a pioneer drug to 
market is to obtain FDA approval of a New Drug Application (“NDA”).
 25  The Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) empowers FDA to monitor and review the safety 
of any new drug prior to sale and marketing.  As part of this process, drug manufacturers 
must file an NDA providing detailed information about the safety and effectiveness of 
each new drug intended for sale.  
 
1. Pre-Hatch-Waxman generic drug regime 
Prior to the passage of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act of 1984 (“Hatch-Waxman”), manufacturers of generic pharmaceuticals faced 
significant obstacles in bringing generic versions of pioneer drugs to market.
26  Under the 
pre-1984 FDCA regime, a company seeking to develop and introduce a generic version 
of a licensed drug had to go through the same rigorous NDA process as a pioneer drug 
manufacturer.
27  However, the research supporting the pioneer NDA was protected as 
trade secrets, meaning that unless the generic company was able to enter into a licensing 
agreement with the pioneer company, the former was forced to conduct its own studies 
                                                 
24 Id. 
25 21 U.S.C. § 355. 
26 See generally Raymond Fersko et al., “Hatch Waxman: A Work in Progress - Responding to the 
Conundrum: How to Encourage Innovative New Drugs While Reducing the Cost of Access,” 8 J. Biolaw 
Bus. 20 (2005). 
27 Id. 11 
and develop its own safety and effectiveness data.
28  Further, the patent laws precluded 
other parties from studying the pioneer drug while it was under patent protection, nor 
could they conduct experimentation in order to replicate a generic version.
29  The result 
was that generic manufacturers could not even begin the lengthy and expensive drug 
development and testing process until the pioneer patent expired.  Moreover, unlike the 
pioneer company, the generic would never be able to charge monopoly prices to help 
recoup its research and development costs.
30  The result of this regime was that pioneer 
drug companies were often able to charge monopoly prices on their branded drugs long 
past the point of patent expiration, and many successful drugs never faced generic 
competition.
31  Of the approximately 150 drugs that went off patent between 1962 and 
1984, none faced competition from generic follow-ons.
32  Nor were generics in a position 
to challenge the validity of the pioneer patents prior to the date of expiration. 
 
2. Hatch-Waxman 
  In passing the Hatch-Waxman amendments to the FDCA, Congress sought to 
reduce the barriers to entry for generic drugs, both during and after the expiration of 
patent protection for pioneer drugs.
33  At the same time, legislators strove to maintain a 
new drug approval regime which would continue to incentivize the development of novel 
drugs.
34  These at times conflicting goals are reflected in several provisions of the Act.  






33 Jon Leibowitz, “‘Pay-for-Delay’ Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry:  How Congress Can Stop 
Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers’ Wallets, and Help Pay for Health Care Reform (The $35 
Billion Solution),” FTC speech (23 June 2009) available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz.shtm. 
34 Id. 12 
To encourage the development and commercialization of generic 
pharmaceuticals, Hatch-Waxman opened a new path to drug approval for generic drugs.  
When filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), a manufacturer no longer 
need conduct and submit to FDA its own safety and effectiveness research.  Rather, after 
demonstrating that its generic version is bioequivalent to the pioneer drug, the generic 
firm can incorporate the safety and effectiveness data developed and submitted by the 
original pioneer drug manufacturer in its NDA application.
35  Further, to ensure that a 
generic version can be ready to enter the market upon expiration of the pioneer patent, 
Hatch-Waxman amended the patent laws so that a generic manufacturer does not infringe 
by studying a pioneer drug, and developing and testing a generic version, during the 
period of patent protection.
36 
  However, Hatch-Waxman goes beyond merely facilitating the post-patent entry of 
low-cost generic drugs.  Rather, it actively incentivizes generic manufacturers to 
challenge what may be weak or invalid branded drug patents prior to expiration.
37  To 
issue such a challenge, a generic firm submitting an ANDA seeking market entry prior to 
the expiration of the pioneer patent files a so-called “Paragraph IV certification.”
38  The 
certification states the applicant’s belief that the patent on the pioneer version of the drug 
either is invalid or would not be infringed by the generic version.
39  This Paragraph IV 
filing sets in motion a series of procedures designed to protect and balance the interests of 
                                                 
35 Lisa M. Ferri and Monique A. Morneault, “Reverse Payment Patent Settlements: The Interplay of 
Antitrust and Patent Policies,” 20 Intell. Prop. & Tech. L.J. 14, 14 (2008).  
36 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1).  See also Ferri and Morneault at 14. 
37 In this paper, I use the term patent “weakness” broadly, to include not only invalid drug patents but also 
those for which, because of the limited scope of their patent claims when properly construed, a generic 
version could be produced without infringement. 
38 21 USCS § 355 (j) (2) (A) (vii) (IV). 
39 Ferri and Morneault at 14-15.  It might not be infringed, for example, if the generic company succeeded 
in designing around the patent so that the generic version was bioequivalent to the patented drug but not all 
of the patent claims read onto the generic. 13 
the generic filer and the pioneer drug manufacturer.  First, Paragraph IV certification 
creates an immediate cause of action for patent infringement by the pioneer drug 
manufacturer.
40  That is, unlike in normal patent infringement suits, the pharmaceutical 
patent holder need not wait until another party actually enters the market with an 
allegedly infringing product to have standing to sue.  Second, the ANDA filer must notify 
the patent holder of its intent to challenge the patent, upon such notice of which Hatch-
Waxman grants the patentee 45 days within which to sue for infringement.
41  If the patent 
holder does opt to file suit, the Act imposes an automatic stay of 30 months, during which 
FDA cannot approve the ANDA.
42  In theory, the 30-month stay provides sufficient time 
for the parties to litigate the generic challenge and avoids the disruption to both drug 
manufacturers and consumers which would obtain if the generic were to enter and then 
subsequently leave the market.
43  The court can prolong this stay by granting the patent 
holder a preliminary injunction, which “extends the FDA approval process pretty much 
indefinitely until the court rules that the patent is either invalid or not infringed.”
44 
Third, Hatch-Waxman grants the first generic challenger to submit a 
“substantially complete” ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification a 180-day exclusivity 
period during which no other generic version of the drug may be approved.
45  The 180-
day period does not begin to run until after the first generic filer commences marketing of 




43 Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp., 146 F.Supp.2d 572, 579 (D.N.J.2001) 
(citing to 130 Cong. Rec. H9118 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman); 130 Cong. Rec. 
S10504 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“[T]he purpose of the 30-month stay is . . . to 
create an adequate window of time during which to litigate the question of whether a generic will infringe 
the patented product, without actually having to introduce the generic product to the market.”). 
44 A. Paul Heeringa, “Dodging Antitrust Bullets in Patent Settlement Agreements: Lessons Learned from 
the ‘Reverse Payment’ Dilemma,” 5 DePaul Bus. & Com. L.J. 266, 274 (2007). 
45 Ferri and Morneault at 14-15.   14 
the generic drug.
 46  However, under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003, Congress amended Hatch-Waxman so that the first ANDA 
filer may forfeit its exclusivity period.
47  Exclusivity can be forfeited if, inter alia, the 
first ANDA filer fails to launch its product promptly after the 30-month stay expires or a 
court enters a final decision that the patent is invalid or not infringed, or if it loses a 
complaint charging that an agreement governing the drug violates the antitrust laws.
 48 
 During the duopolistic 180-day exclusivity period, the generic version will 
typically be priced lower than the branded drug (which has been commanding a 
monopoly price), but well above the competitive market price which will obtain once 
other generics enter the market.
49  This valuable six months of generic exclusivity is 
intended to overcome the collective action problems that would otherwise discourage the 
challenging of pioneer drug patents.
50  That is, without the reward of temporary generic 
market exclusivity, a would-be generic entrant would be deterred from investing the 
funds necessary to mount a legal battle against the pioneer drug manufacturer, knowing 
that if it succeeded other generic firms could free ride on its success, enter the market, 
and quickly drive the price down to a competitive level.
51  
  At the same time, Hatch-Waxman was not without benefit for the pioneer drug 
companies.  The Act provided brand-name drug companies with patent term extensions 
                                                 
46 21 USCS § 355(j) (5) (B) (iv) (I).  The Hatch-Waxman provisions regarding Paragraph IV certification 
were amended as part of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, with the impact of those amendments 
clarified by FDA guidance issued in October 2004.  See Clifford M. Davidson, “More than One Year Later 
– MMA’s Effect on Hatch-Waxman,” (2005), available at http://www.ddkpatent.com/pubs/MoreThan.pdf.  
47 21 USCS § 355 (j) (5) (D). 
48 Id. 
49 See Anne Layne-Farrar, “Reversing the Trend? The Possibility that Rule Changes may Lead to Fewer 
Reverse Payments in Pharma Settlements,” 5 Competition Pol’y Int’l 165, 169-70 (2009). 
50 John R. Thomas, “Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent 
Bounties,” 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 305, 337 (2001). 
51 Id. 15 
to compensate for delays in commercialization resulting from the lengthy NDA approval 
process, in addition to nonpatent market exclusivity in certain cases.
52  Further, the 
automatic 30-month stay imposed for Paragraph IV challenges amounts to the patent 
holder obtaining the equivalent of a 2.5 year preliminary injunction without needing to 
make any showing on the merits.
53 
  Hatch-Waxman has been largely successful at accomplishing its stated purposes.
54  
Generic drugs accounted for 65 percent of all prescriptions issued in 2008, up from fewer 
than 20 percent at the time Congress passed the Act in 1984.
55  Although most have 
entered the market after the expiration of the corresponding pioneer patent, a number of 
generics have entered by successfully challenging pioneer patents through the Paragraph 
IV process.
56  Average drug prices have declined significantly as a result of these 
trends,
57 both because manufacturers of generics have lower cost structures
58 and because 
the advent of competition drives down prices.
59  At the same time, pioneer drug 
development proceeds apace, with the FDA approving 100 NDAs in 2009, up from 76 in 
1983, the year before Hatch-Waxman went into effect.
60 
In summary, then, the Hatch-Waxman regime, when properly functioning, (1) 
rewards the first generic firm to challenge potentially weak patents which are improperly 
                                                 
52 35 USCS § 156.  See Reid F. Herlihy, Note: “The Federal Circuit’s Interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act: Allowing Generics to Induce Infringement,” 15 Fed. Cir. B.J. 119, 121 (2005). 
53 Michael Kades, “Whistling Past the Graveyard: The Problem with the Per Se Legality Treatment of Pay-
for-Delay Settlements,” 5 Competition Pol'y Int'l 143, 146 (2009). 
54 See Leibowitz. 
55 Michael A. Carrier, “Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive Illegality,” 108 
Mich. L. Rev. 37, 49 (2009) (hereinafter “Carrier 2009”). 
56 See Leibowitz (citing a 2002 FTC study finding that when Paragraph IV patent challenges were litigated 
to trial, the generics won over two-thirds of the time). 
57 Id.  
58 Onoe at 532-33 (explaining that they need “not incur the research, development, and promotional costs 
normally associated with the creation and marketing of an original product”). 
59 Onoe at 533. 
60 Drugs@FDA database, searched 25 April 2010, available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Reports.ReportsMenu. 16 
imposing monopoly drug pricing on consumers; (2) allows drug patent validity 
challenges to be resolved prior to costly commercialization of a potentially infringing 
product; (3) preserves and prolongs the patent monopoly of truly innovative drugs; and 
(4) ensures that competitive pricing is achieved within several years of the filing of a 
legitimate pharmaceutical patent challenge. 
 
3. Pharmaceutical patent dispute settlements under Hatch-Waxman 
  Despite its successes, Hatch-Waxman did have one “unintended consequence,”
61 
which was the emergence of the reverse payment, or “pay-for-delay,” settlement 
agreement.  Outside the pharmaceutical industry, the normal way to challenge a disputed 
patent would be for an alleged infringer to place his or her product on the market, and for 
the patent holder to sue for infringement damages and an injunction against future sales.  
If, as often happens,
62 the parties decide to settle their lawsuit, the infringer will 
frequently pay the patent holder a share of the alleged damages arising from the 
infringer’s time on the market.
63  Because settlements take place “in the shadow of the 
law,” the share of the claimed damages which the defendant infringer agrees to pay 
typically rises the more likely the infringer is to get an adverse verdict, based on the 
probability that a court will find that the disputed patent was both valid and infringed.
 64  
So for example, if a patent holder (PH) loses $10 million in profits during the time that an 
infringing manufacturer (IM) is on the market, but the parties agree that there is a 70 
                                                 
61 Ferri and Morneault at 15. 
62 Heeringa at 274. 
63 Such damages include both the loss of volume sales resulting from loss of market share to the infringer, 
as well as reduced profitability on the remaining sales stemming from the advent of price competition in 
those cases where the patent had previously conferred market power on the plaintiff. 
64 Robert J. Rhee, “Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of Public Adjudication,” 84 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 514, 516 (2009). 17 
percent likelihood that a court would not uphold the patent, the parties might agree to a 
settlement under which IM agrees to pay PH $3 million – PH’s expected value at 
litigation (ignoring transaction costs).  Beyond assessing these “damages,” the settlement 
may require IM to pull the infringing product from the market, or there may be some sort 
of licensing or contract manufacturing agreement. 
  Under Hatch-Waxman, by contrast, the legal challenge typically comes before the 
allegedly infringing product is ever commercialized, because the Act makes the filing of 
a Paragraph IV ANDA itself an infringement.  Because the actual infringement imposes 
no monetary damage on the patent holder, in this case splitting the difference will mean 
that proper settlement damages will in theory be “reversed.”  That is, if there is a 70 
percent chance that the pioneer drug patent is invalid, and if the generic firm lost $10 
million in potential profits during the time when it was excluded from marketing its 
generic drug, then a settlement might entail the patent holder paying the infringer $7 
million to compensate for what the latter could have earned by marketing its drug during 
that period.  In reality, a reasonable payment might be somewhat higher, reflecting PH’s 
desire to avoid the costs and uncertainty inherent in the litigation process.  And again, 
such a payment might be paired with an agreement for IM to stay off the market, 
licensing or contract manufacturing, etc.
 65  
  Another alternative is that rather than PH paying IM to settle the infringement 
claim, the parties might agree to delay the point at which IM could enter the market with 
its generic drug.  So, for example, if PH’s pioneer drug had 10 years of patent life 
remaining at the time IM filed its ANDA, and assuming again that the parties agreed that 
the pioneer patent was only 30 percent likely to withstand legal challenge, the parties 
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might agree that IM would wait three years and then market its generic drug during the 
remaining seven years of the patent.
66   
Finally, these two approaches can be combined in a pay-for-delay settlement 
agreement.  Under a PFD, the generic agrees to refrain from entering the market longer 
than it would have if the duration of delay correlated solely with its chance of prevailing 
at trial -- so for more than three years in the previous hypothetical.  The additional delay 
is compensated by a monetary reverse payment from the pioneer drug company.
67  The 
prevalence of such agreements has increased significantly in recent years.  According to a 
U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) report, in 2007 branded and generic drug 
companies reached more than 30 agreements to settle patent litigation, with 14 of those 
agreements including compensation to the generic challenger and an agreement to delay 
marketing of a generic version of a drug.
 68  That compares with zero such agreements in 
2004, and only three in 2005.
69 
                                                 
66 See Michael Carrier, 2 April 2009 blog post, available at 
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67 As PFDs have come under increasing antitrust scrutiny, a rising number of Hatch-Waxman settlements 
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American Antitrust Institute, Transition Report on Competition Policy, 336 (2008) available at 
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68 Ferri and Morenault at 17 (citing “Agreements Filed with the FTC under the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
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69 Id. 19 
III. THE ANTITRUST CHALLENGE 
As early as the late 1990s, the FTC took the position that pay-for-delay 
settlements of patent infringement claims arising out of Paragraph IV Hatch-Waxman 
ANDA filings are presumptively anticompetitive and violate the antitrust laws.
70  The 
Commission’s opposition stems from the belief that if a patent is sufficiently likely to be 
found invalid to warrant an ANDA challenge, then for the patent holder (i.e., the 
manufacturer of the branded pioneer drug) and the generic challenger to agree to 
maintain the patent monopoly, and to divide the resulting monopoly profits, amounts to a 
conspiracy to deprive consumers of the benefits of a competitive market.
71  According to 
a recent FTC study, such agreements cost consumers and the federal government (the 
largest purchaser of pharmaceutical products in the U.S.) an estimated $3.5 billion per 
year in higher drug prices.
72  As a result of these concerns, both the FTC and private 
parties have challenged a number of PFD agreements in the courts.  Their general lack of 
success on that front has put growing pressure on Congress to forge a legislative solution. 
 
A. THE SHERMAN ACT 
  The primary antitrust law in the U.S. is the Sherman Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
1-7.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form 
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States.” 
73  The standard courts use to decide whether a particular multi-party agreement 
unreasonably restrains trade under the Sherman Act depends on what general type of 
                                                 
70 Geraldine M. Alexis and Zorah Braithwaite, “FTC Improperly Injects Itself into Drug Patent 
Settlements,” 16:47 Washington Legal Foundation Legal Backgrounder 2-3 (2001). 
71 Id. 
72 See generally Leibowitz. 
73 15 U.S.C. § 1. 20 
agreement it is.
74  The “accepted” or default standard is the rule of reason, under which 
“the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive 
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition. 
Appropriate factors to take into account include specific information about the relevant 
business and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect. . . . In its design and function the 
rule distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the 
consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s best 
interest.”
75  This typically occurs through balancing the pro-competitive and anti-
competitive aspects of an agreement, and then considering whether the purported benefits 
might be achieved by less restrictive or problematic means.
76 
  In other cases, where courts have sufficient experience with a category of 
agreements to conclude that they “would always or almost always tend to restrict 
competition and decrease output,” the Supreme Court has deemed them to be per se 
illegal.
77  Imposing a per se standard “eliminates the need to study the reasonableness of 
an individual restraint in light of the real market forces at work [and gives courts] clear 
guidance for certain conduct.  Restraints that are per se unlawful include horizontal 
agreements among competitors to fix prices . . . or to divide markets. . . . To justify a per 
se prohibition a restraint must have manifestly anticompetitive effects . . . and lack any 
redeeming virtue.”
78 
  Lastly, in certain cases courts will employ a hybrid “quick look” or “truncated 
rule of reason” standard.  This more flexible standard of review, which allows a court to 
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conduct less than the full rule of reason analysis, makes sense when challenged 
agreements “are not per se unlawful but are sufficiently anticompetitive on their face that 
they do not require a full-blown rule of reason inquiry.”
79  
The Sherman Act is administered both by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and by the FTC.
80  In addition, both the Sherman Act and 
the Clayton Act give private parties a right of action for treble damages if they can 
establish that they have antitrust standing.
81 
 
  B. ANTITRUST CHALLENGES TO PAY-FOR-DELAY AGREEMENTS 
  As they have become more prominent in recent years, PFD settlements have come 
under increasing scrutiny, and antitrust challenges have been brought both by the elected 
branches and private parties.  Concerns regarding the potential anticompetitive impact of 
PFDs arise from the fact that, at least superficially, they appear to be horizontal market 
divisions, a type of agreement which the Supreme Court has deemed to be per se 
illegal.
82  That is, in a PFD a monopolist (the branded drug manufacturer) is paying a 
potential competitor (the generic firm) to stay off the market, at least for a period of time, 
which allows the former to continue to charge monopoly prices.   
  Of course, the same sort of concern arises any time two firms settle a patent 
infringement dispute so that the infringer agrees to leave, or stay off, the market.
83  
                                                 
79 Onoe at 537 (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 763 (1999), and arguing for applying the 
quick look standard to PFDs). 
80 Areeda, Kaplow and Edlin, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, and Cases 43-45 (2004). 
81 Id. at 58-67. 
82 Leegin at 904. 
83 Compare the Supreme Court’s treatment of such agreements in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 
U.S. 163, 171 (1931) (“Where there are legitimately conflicting claims or threatened interferences, a 22 
However, the potential antitrust threat is greater in the unique context of the Hatch-
Waxman regime.
84  To see why this is so, consider a traditional patent infringement 
settlement, one where the patent holder (PH) has lost, say, $10 million in profits during a 
year (Y1) in which the infringing manufacturer (IM) was on the market.  When 
negotiating a settlement under which IM will agree to leave the market and pay damages 
to compensate PH for part of its loss, the interests of the two parties are fully opposed.  
IM has no future market prospects (at least until PH’s patent expires), and so it can “win” 
only by having to pay less of the $10 million in compensation to PH.  Importantly, in this 
scenario, consumers have already derived some benefit from the year’s worth of 
competition during Y1.  The parties are now left to divvy up what was left of the Y1 
market after purchasers took the consumer surplus in the form of reduced prices.  That is, 
the potential settlement pie to be divided by the parties, based on their expected outcomes 
at litigation, is what is left after consumers have gained some economic benefit from 
competition.  Consumers are not players in this zero-sum game.  
In the Hatch-Waxman context, by contrast, where de jure infringement occurs 
prior to the imposition of any damage on PH, there is no upper limit on the possible size 
of PH’s reverse payment to IM.
85  Indeed, in some cases the would-be infringer actually 
receives more in settlement payments than it would have earned by infringing and 
marketing its generic.
86   
                                                                                                                                                
settlement by agreement, rather than litigation, is not precluded by the [Sherman] Act.”) with United States 
v. Singer, 374 U.S. 174 (1963) (finding antitrust liability where the parties intended to conspire to violate 
the Sherman Act). 
84 See generally Carrier blogpost. 
85 See Seidenberg (noting that PFD settlements “can run into hundreds of millions of dollars”).  Of course, 
in most cases it would be economically irrational for PH to pay IM more than PH’s total expected profits 
from selling under the patent. 
86 Carrier 2009 at 73 (“Red flags of potential invalidity are raised when brands pay generics more 23 
Consider a scenario, then, in which PH has been charging a monopoly price of 
$100 for a pill which costs $10 to produce, based on a patent set to expire in five years.  
If IM were to put a generic version on the market, and other generics were to follow, 
assume the price would drop to $12 per pill.  Here, a PFD agreement might entail IM 
agreeing to stay off the market for three years, in exchange for PH paying it $15 per pill 
for 70 percent of PH’s sales volume (assume that this would be IM’s expected market 
share in a competitive market).  PH continues to receive a monopoly price of $85 on 
those sales during the three year period of market exclusivity, earning a per-pill profit of 
$75, and PH receives $15 per pill for doing absolutely nothing, versus a $2 profit if it 
were to actually commercialize its drug.   
The problem here is that in a PFD agreement the consumer surplus is on the table, 
with the interests of the parties aligned against consumer welfare.  The longer IM stays 
off the market, the longer the parties have the $88 per pill of monopoly rents to play with.  
The concern thus arises that the reverse payments in PFD agreements “make possible 
agreements that do not reflect the parties’ reasonable assessment of success in patent 
litigation.”
87  Indeed, such an agreement may presumptively indicate that the PH does not 
actually believe that it would win in litigation.
88   
 
C. THE DEBATE  
  The crux of the antitrust complaint against pay-for-delay pharmaceutical 
settlement agreements, then, is that they essentially amount to branded pharmaceutical 
                                                                                                                                                
than they ever could have gained by entering the market. . . . The generic, in fact, often gains more through 
settlement than through successful litigation.”); Seidenberg (“The supposed infringer is not merely getting 
off scot-free but is also getting extremely well-compensated by the supposedly injured party.”). 
87 Carrier blogpost. 
88 Id. 24 
manufacturers conspiring with would-be generic challengers to maintain monopolies 
based on potentially invalid patents.  Plaintiffs and defendants then divide the resulting 
profits, which stem from overcharging consumers and the government for lifesaving 
medicines.   
Whether this is in fact the proper way to characterize these agreements, and how 
the courts should handle such antitrust claims, is disputed along several parameters.  
Ultimately, however, the core of the argument is over which of two incommensurable 
paradigms should trump: the antitrust rule that horizontal market divisions are per se 
illegal, regardless of the unique conditions under which they occur, or the IP principles 
that patents are presumed valid, and that a patent holder is free to maintain, share or 
devise his legal monopoly over his invention in any way he sees fit. 
 
    1. Judicial statements 
  Courts and commentators on both sides of the debate have a tendency to beg the 
question.  In one camp are those who begin, and end, with the proposition that any 
agreement between competitors to restrict output, divide markets or set prices is per se 
illegal.  Once that conclusion is reached, the essence of the per se standard is that courts 
need not – and ought not – consider other extenuating factors, such as the special 
characteristics of the particular industry, or any potential pro-competitive justifications.  
Indeed, the principle value of the per se standard is that is spares courts and litigants from 
having to delve into the quiddities of each individual deal – and there will always be 
claims that a particular situation is different or unique – when experience teaches that this 25 
type of agreement is for the most part without redeeming virtues.  PFDs are that sort of 
agreement, so the argument goes, and ergo illegal. 
  That is the position the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
reached, both initially and (having taken a closer look) on remand, in the Terazosin 
case.
89  Citing the Supreme Court’s Topco decision
90 and the Hovencamp treatise
91 for 
the proposition that horizontal market allocations are per se illegal,
92 the court dismissed 
the patent issue with the blanket assertion that when a pioneer firm pays a generic 
challenger a sum that does “not have a demonstrable link to the amount of damages that 
[the generic] would incur if [the pioneer] obtained an injunction but was ultimately 
unsuccessful in the infringement action,” the agreement exceeds the scope of the patent.
93  
The Sixth Circuit concurred in Cardizem,
94 indicating that the “anticompetitive potential 
inherent in all price-fixing agreements justifies their facial invalidation even if 
procompetitive justifications are offered. . . . Thus, the law is clear that once it is decided 
that a restraint is subject to per se analysis, the claimed lack of any actual anticompetitive 
effects or presence of procompetitive effects is irrelevant.”
95  The FTC and many 
commentators have reached similar conclusions.
96   
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95 Id. at 909. 
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Since 2003, however, the majority of courts to consider the question have come to 
the opposite conclusion, that such agreements are presumptively legal.
97  These courts 
begin from the premise that a patent is by its very nature the grant of a monopoly, so that 
an agreement which merely preserves the period of market exclusivity conveyed by a 
patent can be anticompetitive only where it exceeds the exclusionary scope of the patent.  
This might occur, for example, if the parties agreed not to compete in the provision of 
other products not claimed by the patent, if they maintained market exclusivity past the 
patent’s expiration date, or if they entered into sham infringement litigation and a 
subsequent settlement merely as a pretext for colluding to fix prices and divide markets.
98 
  Ultimately, the problem may be inherent in the somewhat circular nature of the 
per se standard itself.  An instance of concerted action is treated as illegal, without 
reference to the unique characteristics of the agreement or the industry in which it 
transpires, if it is sufficiently akin to other types of agreements that have been found in 
the past to be clearly anticompetitive.  But it is arguably precisely those unique traits and 
features that make a particular agreement a different sort of creature from those that have 
been analyzed in the past, and so not amenable to per se treatment.  That is to say, one 
can only determine if an agreement is sufficiently like those deemed per se illegal by 
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claim that the patent is invalid or not infringed). 27 
considering its distinctive traits, but that consideration is precisely what the per se 
standard forbids.  The arguments often made with regard to PFD settlements bring this 
problem into especially stark relief. 
     
2. The innovation approach 
One possible way out of this dilemma, a way favored by many proponents of PFD 
agreements, is to consider the reasons why society provides intellectual property rights in 
the first place.  In the Terazosin case, for example, the Eleventh Circuit began from the 
conventional assumption that ideas, inventions and other forms of intellectual property 
should be freely available to all, absent a compelling societal interest to the contrary.  The 
main justification for granting a patent or copyright on IP is that the reward of a 
temporary monopoly is necessary to incentivize innovation, where the fruits of research 
and creation will otherwise be wholly externalized.  The court explained that the 
“exclusionary right is granted to allow the patentee to exploit whatever degree of market 
power it might gain thereby as an incentive to induce investment in innovation and the 
public disclosure of inventions.”
99   
On this view, the degree of legal protection granted to a patent holder should be 
only that necessary to encourage and reward socially useful innovation.  Mark Lemley 
sums up this perspective nicely: 
Intellectual property protection in the United States has always been about 
generating incentives to create. Thomas Jefferson was of the view that 
“inventions cannot, in nature, be a subject of property;” for him, the 
question was whether the benefit of encouraging innovation was “worth to 
the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent.”  On this long-
standing view, free competition is the norm.  Intellectual property rights 
are an exception to that norm, and they are granted only when-and only to 
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the extent that-they are necessary to encourage invention. . . . On this 
view, the proper goal of intellectual property law is to give as little 
protection as possible consistent with encouraging innovation.
100 
 
One might think that evaluating PFD settlements against the backdrop of a world 
in which innovations such as new drug formulations are freely sharable would argue in 
favor of strict scrutiny of agreements which prolong the monopoly granted by dubious 
patents.  In fact, however, this emphasis on innovation tends to work in the opposite 
direction.  If we focus on the fact that IP rights are warranted as needed to encourage 
creation, and then consider the prohibitive costs involved in developing and testing a 
new, potentially lifesaving medicine, then the logical conclusion may be that pioneer 
drug companies should be given broad leeway over the exercise of their patent rights.  
Further, the fact that patent protection is of limited duration makes one less wary of 
permitting restrictions on consumer access to the benefits of price competition, knowing 
that any such burden on the free market system has been narrowly tailored and will be 
relatively short lived. 
 
                                                 
100 Mark A. Lemley, “Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding,” 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1031 (2005) (some 
internal punctuation omitted) (hereinafter “Lemley”). 29 
IV. A REVERSE PERSPECTIVE 
A. THE OWNERSHIP CONTINUUM 
I am not convinced that a but-for world of fully unprotected IP rights presents the 
proper lens through which to view PFD settlements.  That approach emphasizes the 
intellectual component of “intellectual property.”  It appeals to the notion that IP is not all 
that different from a passing thought, an off-the-cuff comment, or other products of the 
human psyche.  But there is, in a very real sense, also a property component to 
“intellectual property.”  Companies acquire, value and protect their intellectual property 
in a manner akin to other, physical assets.  IP such as a new pharmaceutical formulation 
or a Hollywood movie can be the result of years of toil and hundreds of millions of 
dollars of financial investment.  And the creator of IP may have just as strong a desire to 
exclude others from its use as an owner of land or chattels. 
Turning for a moment to actual, tangible physical property, on the ownership 
spectrum, physical property falls at the opposite extreme from those passing remarks and 
stray thoughts.  Making but a few exceptions (e.g., takings, adverse possession), the law 
grants us a full monopoly over our tangible property, one of potentially infinite duration.  
This is a monopoly in two senses of the term.  First, the law grants us the sole right to 
control our own physical assets, defined in terms of the power to exclude others from 
their use.  This is the sense in which Adam Smith spoke of land as a monopoly,
101 a 
characterization that David Hume extended to all private property.
102  Second, one’s 
ownership over a physical asset carries with it the innate the potential to become an 
actual market monopoly in the antitrust sense.  This is of course true of unique physical 
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assets; if I own an original Picasso painting, I may charge others quite a bit for the 
pleasure of viewing it.
103  But even more-or-less fungible property has the potential to 
transform an ownership monopoly into economic monopoly, given the right external 
circumstances.  For example, my backyard might be home to 20 scrub pine trees, each 
virtually indistinguishable from the millions of other scrub pines across Massachusetts.  
But if the last known pair of a highly endangered bird species were to select one of my 
trees for nesting, I would instantly gain the ability to charge for access the various 
ornithologists, photographers, birders and collectors who might take an interest in that 
tree. 
I will assume for the sake of argument that where a reverse payment takes place 
within the context of a real property dispute, there is no question of antitrust liability.  For 
example, when an owner (A) sues to quiet title to a piece of real property in which a 
second party (B) claims an interest, one possible resolution of such a suit is that A will 
pay B to drop B’s claim to the property.
104  A’s payment to B will presumably represent 
some portion of the value of B’s claim to the asset, with the size of the share reflecting 
both anticipated litigation costs and the parties’ expectations of success were they to 
litigate to a final decision.  Now further assume that the disputed asset is one which by 
happenstance gives rise to an economic monopoly.  Say, for example, that A owns land 
containing the only salt mine for 200 miles, so that, given the high cost of transporting 
salt relative to its price, A can charge monopoly rents in the local salt market.  Now B 
comes along and claims title to ten percent of A’s land.  If valid, B’s claim would allow 
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him to compete with A in the local salt business, driving down prices.  If the parties settle 
the dispute with A paying B to drop his claim, leaving A in sole control of that market, I 
will assume that absent any other evidence of anticompetitive conduct, the agreement 
would survive antitrust scrutiny since it merely preserves the potential to monopolize 
inherent in all physical property. 
 
B. REAL v. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
So a different way to select the paradigm by which we should assess the 
reasonableness and anti-competitiveness of a PFD agreement is to ask not how 
pharmaceutical development differs from other types of legally unprotected intellectual 
activity, but rather to query how IP such as a drug formulation differs from physical 
property, which receives more robust legal protection.  IP and physical property differ in 
at least two important ways.  Both tend to suggest that we should afford less, rather than 
more, legal protection to PFD agreements; both point in the direction of antitrust law 
trumping patent law in close cases regarding intellectual property. 
 
  1. Intellectual property is infinitely replicable 
First, IP, unlike physical property, is infinitely replicable.  Only one person at a 
time may sit in a particular chair, in front of a particular desk, and type on a particular 
computer.  We permit monopolization (in the ownership, not economic, sense) of 
physical assets in part because in most cases their use is necessarily exclusive.  Of course, 
we might have a property regime favoring public ownership of assets, so that when I was 
not using my computer anyone else might enter and do so.  One reason we do not is the 32 
so-called “tragedy of the commons.”  If my computer were publicly available, each user 
would be inclined to take more than his share (in terms of disk storage space and the like) 
and to give less (in terms of chipping in for memory upgrades, taking the time to 
defragment the drives, etc.).   
The story is very different in the case of IP, which generally does not feature a 
tragedy of the commons.
105  The same software running on my computer can be copied 
and run simultaneously on thousands of others.  Moreover, the marginal cost of doing so 
is almost negligible, especially if the copying and distribution are accomplished 
electronically.  Nor am I likely to suffer overmuch from others’ simultaneous use.  If 
anything, I may benefit if many other clever minds have the opportunity to improve the 
software in an “open source” environment.  So one reason we give less protection to 
inventions under the patent laws than we give to ownership of physical property is that 
protecting IP (1) affords little if any benefit to each user and (2) comes at the tremendous 
cost of restricting the economic benefits associated with being able to leverage an 
economically productive innovation almost infinitely.
106   
These considerations are directly relevant to the PFD question.  To restrict 
unnecessarily the development of a competitive market in pharmaceuticals is to maintain 
exorbitant prices for life saving medications, placing pressures on public and household 
budgets, and in some cases precluding access for the poor both in the U.S. and abroad.
 107  
Everything else being equal, then, we should favor an outcome which would result in 
greater consumer access to affordable medications.   
                                                 
105 Lemley at 1050. 
106 See generally Lemley. 
107 See, e.g., Peter B. Bach, “Limits on Medicare's Ability to Control Rising Spending on Cancer Drugs,” 
360 New Eng. J. Med. 626 (2009). 33 
 
  2. Intellectual property lacks precise boundaries 
The second relevant distinction between real and intellectual property is that the 
boundaries defining the former, as well as the means of identifying those boundaries, are 
much clearer.  Chattels are, for the most part, discrete objects.  There is no doubt where 
my computer ends and yours begins.  Land boundaries, while less distinct, can be 
surveyed and defined according to agreed upon methods.  The disputes are, quite literally, 
at the margins.  Even where clear boundaries lack, as with aqueous property, the law has 
succeeded in defining use rights in such a way as to provide a fairly high degree of 
predictability to those who must rely on their rights and obligations with regard to the 
property. 
Not so with intellectual property.  As discussed previously,
108 both the 
indeterminate nature of language (which defines patent claims) and the unlimited 
potential to combine and vary ideas and innovations mean that whether or not we treat 
them so for legal purposes, as a practical matter, patents are essentially probabilistic. 
Part of why we can grant an enduring monopoly over tangible property, then, is 
the relative ease of determining where one piece stops and the next begins.  Indeed, over 
time the boundaries between pieces of real property may, if anything, become clearer, as 
fences and walls are erected, improvements made, and usage patterns established.  And 
predictable geographic boundaries are not only achievable but necessary, in order to 
promote long-term investment in the land, reduce conflict between neighbors, facilitate 
the alienability of real property, and so forth. 
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By contrast, as new ideas and technologies arise, evolve, and combine in myriad 
ways with other ideas and technologies, over time it becomes increasingly difficult – and 
unnecessary – to trace the origins of a particular “piece” of IP and to determine whether it 
infringes, or merely stands upon, prior art.  Again, these considerations speak directly to 
the PFD issue, and argue for a less deferential construction of IP rights where there is a 
real question as to whether a drug patent is even valid.  On the probabilistic view of 
patents, a PFD which gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that the parties are skeptical of 
the strength of the underlying patent, and which precludes a judicial determination of 
validity (or, especially, infringement), ought not be treated as presumptively free from 
antitrust liability.  We may defer to parties’ settlement of a land dispute where monopoly 
is at stake, such as the salt mine hypothetical, based on (1) our faith that there is in fact a 
determinable right answer to the conflict; and (2) our preference for not unearthing 
settled expectations about the legitimacy of present land ownership.  Neither 
consideration applies in the case of IP. 
 
C. THE PROPERTY BALANCE 
To summarize, then, intellectual property such as a pharmaceutical formulation 
falls somewhere on a continuum between spontaneous ideas and expressions, to which 
society affords no ownership rights at all, and real estate, to which we attach an enduring 
right of exclusion.  In the case of a PFD agreement, the strength of a particular patent has 
come into question, and the costs to society of nevertheless preserving the patent 
monopoly, without the opportunity for judicial determination of its validity, may run into 
the hundreds of millions of dollars.  Lives may even be lost.  So the question is whether 35 
the need to provide sufficient rewards to incentivize the ongoing development of 
pharmaceuticals, and to relieve the burdens on the judicial system by encouraging the 
settlement of lawsuits, outweighs the disadvantages of treating patents in the same way 
we treat real property.  Only if it does ought we exempt PFDs from our usual judgment 
that horizontal market allocations are per se illegal.  There are two main reasons to think 
that we should not afford PFDs that sort of presumed immunity.   
 
  1. The legislative intent of Hatch-Waxman 
First, although the Constitution makes clear that the patent laws in general are 
geared towards incenting innovation, Congress’s primary intent in passing the Hatch-
Waxman amendments appears to have been to encourage generic companies to challenge 
pioneer patents.  It is widely agreed that through the Act Congress sought to balance the 
interests of pioneer drug manufacturers and their generic challengers.
109  This conflict is 
often expressed as a tradeoff between encouraging innovation (by protecting and 
rewarding pioneer patents) and expediting the advent of price competition (by facilitating 
the entry of generic versions).
110   
Less obvious is how exactly Congress sought to strike that balance, and 
particularly how (if at all) the Act sought to protect consumer welfare as a consideration 
independent from, and potentially opposed to, the interests of the various segments of the 
pharmaceutical industry.  Still, there appears to be rather broad agreement among 
                                                 
109 See, e.g., http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/publications/IP/Authorized_Generics.pdf (“The legislative 
intent of Hatch-Waxman was to balance the competing policy interests of manufacturers of brand-name 
drugs and those of the generic trade group.”). 
110 Id; Martha M. Rumore, “The Hatch-Waxman Act— 25 Years Later: Keeping the Pharmaceutical Scale 
Balanced,” Pharmacy Times (15 August 2009) (suggesting that “the legislative intent of Hatch-Waxman 
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antitrust scholars that reverse payment agreements were not an intended result of the 
Act.
111  Rather, the consensus is that the main purpose of Hatch-Waxman was to 
encourage both the development of the generic drug market and the pre-expiration 
challenging of vulnerable drug patents.
112  Supporting this position is Congress’s 2003 
addition of forfeiture provisions to the Act, evincing a desire that patent holders and first 
entry generics not be able to conspire to keep other would-be generics off the market.
113  
Indeed, the Paragraph IV challenges made possible by Hatch-Waxman can occur 
only if a generic firm, acting on behalf of the public (which itself lacks standing to 
challenge the validity of a drug patent), actively prosecutes the claim.  In that sense, 
PFDs fundamentally alter the nature of the regime created by Hatch-Waxman, aligning 
the interests of the generic applicant with those of the branded drug maker (in preserving 
and exploiting monopoly pricing) and against those of the public (whose potential 
consumer surplus is siphoned into the reverse payment).  Particularly in a case where the 
pioneer company pays the generic more to stay off the market than the latter could have 
earned by actually entering and competing (an outcome which one assumes is 
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exclusivity for Ramipril Capsules,” (19 October 2007) available at 
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increasingly likely the more vulnerable the challenged patent), one is hard pressed to see 
why a generic would ever aggressively prosecute a meritorious claim in the way that the 
Hatch-Waxman drafters intended.  In that regard, PFDs run directly counter to the 
legislative intent animating Hatch-Waxman, even accounting for the Act’s continued 
interest in promoting innovation. 
 
  2. Empirical considerations 
A second set of considerations when evaluating whether we ought to favor the 
traditional view of intellectual property (which tends to favor immunity from antitrust 
liability for PFDs) or the “reverse view” which I have outlined (which tends in the other 
direction) are the likely empirical consequences of either choice.  As conceptually 
attractive as a reverse approach might be, it will hold little appeal if the proponents of 
PFDs are correct that banning such agreements will hamper either the development of 
new pioneer drugs or the commercialization of the generic versions that Hatch-Waxman 
sought to promote. 
 
    a. Settlements 
  There is little disagreement that, as a general matter, settlements are a necessary 
and desirable element of our legal system.  Settlements are “efficient and socially 
beneficial.  They avoid unnecessary litigation costs and, more important, create certainty 38 
that allows parties to plan and invest for the future.”
114  This is especially true in the case 
of patent litigation, which tends to be complicated and resource-intensive.
115   
  Those opposed to imposing restrictions on the ability of branded and generic drug 
manufacturers to enter into PFD settlements of litigation resulting from Paragraph IV 
claims argue that restrictions would make it more difficult to settle such disputes.  This, 
in turn, would both deter generic firms from bringing ANDA challenges and result in 
prolonged litigation where such claims were brought.  Both results would be undesirable.  
Fewer challenges would mean that some pioneer drugs that would lose at least part of 
their patent monopoly period under the current regime would instead continue to control 
the market, resulting in higher prices to consumers and frustrating the goals of Hatch-
Waxman.
116  At the same time, unnecessarily lengthy litigation would clog the courts, 
result in greater uncertainty and possibly delay the entry of generics.
117 
This argument rests on several questionable assumptions.  First, there is the 
assumption that reverse payments are an important, even necessary, tool in the settlement 
toolbox.  If such payments were treated as presumptively illegal, the argument goes, 
fewer settlements could be accomplished.
118  Marc Schildkraut, for example, speculates 
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that reverse payments can provide essential support to a “cash-strapped alleged infringer 
[who] needs to receive cash earlier rather than later,” and hence who will be more 
amenable to settlement when some cash is on the table.
119  I am skeptical that a firm on 
the verge of gaining approval for a generic version of a blockbuster drug would have no 
access to venture or other sources of capital, even in the current economic climate.  
Indeed, one wonders how the hypothetical cash-starved generic firm intended to bring its 
product to market in the case that the brand owner simply declined to challenge its 
ANDA, or in the event that settlement was not reached and the generic won at trial.  
Surely a business plan that depended for its funding on the possibility that the firms 
would enter into a PFD would be a highly risky proposition. 
Indeed, critics of PFDs properly question why parties to Paragraph IV patent 
litigation cannot simply settle their disputes based on earlier generic entry without reverse 
payments, rather than later entry with payments.
 120  This would maintain the desirable 
alignment of consumer and generic interests (both will want generic entry at the earliest 
possible date), while still encouraging parties to settle their disputes and recognizing the 
patent holder’s ultimate control over its patent.  As the FTC argued in Schering-Plough: 
 
If there has been a payment from the patent holder to the generic 
challenger, there must have been some offsetting consideration.  Absent 
proof of other offsetting consideration, it is logical to conclude that the 
quid pro quo for the payment was an agreement by the generic to defer 
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Thus, critics conclude, if, in a given case, a reverse payment is truly necessary to achieve 
settlement, then it is only because the settlement is one which prolongs a dubious patent 
at consumers’ expense.  We ought not mourn the loss of such agreements. 
   
    b. Paragraph IV challenges 
A second empirical claim made by supporters of PFDs is that the possibility of 
achieving settlement is a major factor motivating generic drug companies to bring 
Paragraph IV challenges.  Thus, assuming that imposing per se liability on PFDs would 
chill settlements, it would also thwart the purposes of Hatch-Waxman by slowing the 
penetration of generic drugs.  The Generic Pharmaceutical Association, for example, has 
warned that that “an across-the-board ban [on pay-for-delay pacts] would reduce the 
number of patent challenges brought by generics, creating an unnecessary hurdle to 
bringing lower cost generic drugs to the market.”
122  Judge Posner embraced this position 
in Asahi Glass v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals, reasoning that a “ban on reverse-payment 
settlements would reduce the incentive to challenge patents by reducing the challenger’s 
settlement options should he be sued for infringement, and so might well be thought 
anticompetitive.”
123  
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Again, critics of PFDs respond here – rightfully so, I think – that if generic 
ANDAs are enticed primarily by the possibility of entering into settlements in which they 
will earn more by staying off the market than by actually competing, then we ought not 
celebrate such challenges.
124  Beyond that, there is serious doubt as to whether generic 
firms would really stop filing ANDAs if PFD settlements were taken off the table.  FTC 
Chairman Jon Leibowitz points out that companies actively brought, and settled, 
Paragraph IV challenges prior to the early 2000s, when reverse payments first became 
commonplace.  They “simply picked a date based on the strength of their case without 
any exclusion payments.”
125  Thus, there is strong reason to believe that (1) PFDs, if 
made illegal, would most likely be replaced by more pro-competitive types of settlement 
agreements; and (2) where the availability of PFDs does skew parties’ incentives, it is 
precisely because such agreements improperly allow them to appropriate the consumer 
surplus which would result from a competitive drug market.  Claims to the contrary are 
belied by the Act’s successful two-decade record of cultivating a flourishing generic drug 
industry before PFDs ever entered the picture.
126 
   
                                                 
124 See, e.g., Leibowitz (“In any event, if generics are filing patent challenges only to get a payoff, then 
those patent challenges are no longer serving consumers.”). 
125 Leibowitz. 
126 A third point of empirical dispute, the resolution of which lies beyond the ambit of this paper, concerns 
the extent to which a PFD agreement is able to create a “cork-in-the-bottle” effect by “parking” the first 
ANDA filer’s 180-day exclusivity period so that other generics are excluded indefinitely from the market 
(or at least until patent expiration).  Compare Layne-Farrar at 176 (suggesting that the forfeiture provisions 
implemented by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 have 
eliminated the risk of bottlenecking) with Brankin; Rumore (concluding that “most often the forfeiture is 
avoided by legal maneuvers and ‘bottlenecks’ continue”).  See also the FTC’s testimony before the House 
Commerce Subcomittee, 24-27 (2 May 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/P859910%20Protecting_Consume_%20Access_testimony.pdf (detailing 
various scenarios under which a patent holder could maintain the bottleneck notwithstanding the 2003 
forfeiture rules). 42 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
  In this paper, I have argued that pay-for-delay settlements, or at least the most 
facially anticompetitive types, should be subject to per se antitrust liability.  My reasons 
for thinking such agreements anticompetitive are familiar ones.  PFDs improperly align 
the interests of branded and generic competitors against those of consumers, in a way that 
runs counter to the apparent intent of the Hatch-Waxman amendments.  They maintain 
elevated drug prices when more consumer-friendly early entry agreements could achieve 
the same benefits (aside from elevated drug company profits).  They do not appear to be 
necessary to either the settling of lawsuits or the incentivizing of generic challenges.  And 
they bear strong indicia of a belief by the parties that the contested patents are likely not 
valid. 
  But the question remains whether any of these considerations should count.  After 
all, we are talking about a patent, a form of intellectual property that is presumptively 
valid and, when valid, confers a legal monopoly.  What I have tried to offer here is a 
different paradigm by which to evaluate that claim, one which places less weight on the 
importance of incentivizing innovation and more on the ways in which the notion of 
intellectual “property” is just a metaphor.  To the extent that IP rights confer few of the 
traditional benefits of property ownership, and bear their own unique costs, in close cases 
such as this we should be especially wary of allowing IP to don the mantle of monopoly 
at the expense of public health and welfare. 